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Abstract 
‘Governance’ is a highly plastic concept that has spilled over from the political sciences and 
has been adopted, in some cases rather uncritically, by scholars from other social science 
traditions.  We argue that there are limits to this all-pervasive notion of governance.  Some of 
these limitations could potentially be addressed by the ‘tentative governance’ approach if it 
can create new opportunities for learning in order to cope with the problems of uncertainty at 
an early stage of new and emerging technologies in areas such as the life sciences.  In order 
to move beyond these limits, we may be able to use the heuristic device offered by tentative 
governance as a step towards developing and adopting new rules of engagement.  These 
new rules of engagement need (i) to recognise that consensus may not always be possible 
in areas of new and emerging technology and (ii) to accept a more balanced approach to 
governance that acknowledges the role of policy and politics.  In order to achieve this, we 
need to go beyond science and technology studies (STS) and innovation studies and adopt 
a more interdisciplinary approach that acknowledges the contributions already made to this 
governance debate by a wide range of scholars, including those in the political sciences. 
 
Keywords: Governance; life sciences; consensus; public engagement 
 
Highlights 
• Examines the concept of tentative governance in the context of the life sciences 
• Presents two case studies of tentative and adaptive governance 
• Proposes guidelines for Constructive Stakeholder Engagement 
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1 Introduction 
In the governance of emerging science and technology (EST), we are searching for and 
applying new approaches to cope with the problems of uncertainty.  Kuhlmann et al. (this 
issue) propose a number of roles and modes of ‘tentative governance’ – namely that it is 
generally provisional, flexible, revisable, dynamic and open in its approaches, which include 
experimentation, learning, reflexivity, and reversibility – in order to tackle the uncertainties 
that are accentuated by the highly dynamic nature of EST.  
This means that, as noted by Kuhlmann et al. (ibid.), tentative and more traditional forms of 
governance and government tend to co-exist and to co-evolve.  The contemporary 
governance of science, technology and innovation in many countries thus oscillates, with 
experimentation in novel forms of governance but at the same time we would suggest, a 
possible retrenchment to more stable modes of ‘government’. 
We share Kuhlmann et al.’s understanding of the different forms of governance and its 
hybrid nature.  However, given the intensely politicised nature of some of the engagement 
and dialogue initiatives undertaken as part of the governance process, linked in some cases 
to the social amplification of uncertainty (Stirling, 2014), the aim of tentative governance to 
be ‘neutral in normative terms’ may be difficult to realise in practice.  Also, in developing our 
practice-oriented approaches to governance (generating analysis, diagnosis, policy impact 
and intervention), we are working in the zone where a tentative approach is challenged by 
pressures from innovators for clarity, consistency and stability in the regulatory environment.  
We draw on evidence from case studies of governance in action in the life sciences to argue 
that, in addition to the heuristic device based on the concept of tentative governance, policy 
tools need to provide guidance on making the transition from tentative governance to more 
‘adaptive governance’.  
What is significant about our paper is that it offers a counterbalance to the prevailing, often-
optimistic view, of the role of participation in governance.  We build on the concept of 
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‘tentative governance’ by, first, advocating the need for a shift in the governance mode as an 
innovation moves away from upstream scientific research towards the development of new 
products and processes, and, secondly, calling for a second generation of governance 
approaches.  We argue that, in some circumstances, this requires a more adaptive, practice-
oriented approach to governance than that typically advanced by science and technology 
studies (STS) and we draw on empirical evidence from case studies to propose a novel set 
of guidelines for such an approach. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 evaluates previous governance approaches 
presented in the literature and offers a critique of first generation governance in the context 
of life science innovation.  We highlight some of the challenges of participation and 
engagement and the questionable goal of consensus.  In Section 3 we briefly describe our 
methodology and Section 4 presents two case studies from which we derive and test 
guidelines relevant to the tentative approach (Section 5).  In Section 6 we assess the extent 
to which the concept of tentative governance might move beyond a heuristic device to a 
workable policy tool in order to deliver a more democratic, governance-based approach to 
life science innovation. 
 
2 The limits to governance 
2.1 Tentative governance in the context of the life sciences 
A generation ago, when we considered the relationships between science and society we 
did so through the lens of ‘science policy’, a complex, multidisciplinary endeavour 
encompassing scholars from, inter alia, economics, sociology, politics and the machinery of 
government.  Now when we consider this relationship, we are more likely to talk in terms of 
‘the governance of science’ and, indeed ‘the governance of science and innovation’.  The 
focus has shifted from a predominantly political and economic context for science to a more 
sociological one; one that draws in not just a different set of public actors but a different 
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scholarly community, and addresses more downstream issues related to innovation 
processes rather than fundamental research.  
A tentative governance approach offers flexibility and creates opportunities for learning in 
order to cope with the problems of uncertainty at early stages of research on new and 
emerging technologies.  The focus of this paper is innovation in the life sciences, a field that 
is subject to a broad array of inherent uncertainties related to scientific background, 
technological shape, applications and the resulting economic and societal benefits and risks 
(Kuhlmann et al., this issue). New actor constellations and practices related to knowledge 
production, innovation and societal appropriation have emerged and largely differ from those 
of established technologies. This poses specific challenges to the governance of the life 
sciences, which has to cope with ill-defined, controversial and sometimes moving targets. As 
such, simply broadening decision-making does not obviate the need for political judgements 
(Lyall et al., 2009b; Lyall, 2007), particularly at more downstream stages in development 
processes (Tait, 2017). There is also a need to develop strategies and procedures to help 
decision-makers to govern science, technology, risk and the environment in a way that 
makes best use of appropriate systemic analyses on the basis of the best available evidence 
from both social and natural sciences (Lyall and Tait, 2005, p.186).   
As described in the Introduction to this Special Section, ‘governance’ is generally regarded 
as implying an increasingly complex set of state-society relationships where networks rather 
than hierarchies dominate the policy process. This rather broadly-conceived term is viewed 
as a mechanism for mobilising political resources in situations where these resources are 
widely dispersed among public and private actors, and as a specific form of public-private 
non-hierarchical interaction (Börzel, 1998).  Although the associative model, as a way of 
thinking about state-society relations, is relatively pervasive in the European literature, 
Anglo-American countries are traditionally less accepting of the role of social actors in 
governing (Peters, 2014).  British authors have historically approached the policy network 
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paradigm as a form of ‘interest group intermediation’ (a generic term for all types of 
relationships between interest groups and the state) whereas German and Dutch scholars 
(for example, Kooiman, 1993; Mayntz, 2003) relate governance to wider issues of 
deliberation and civil society development and to legitimacy problems of government. These 
different scholarly traditions result in rather different emphases on governance: on the one 
hand a more adversarial approach that negotiates between interest groups and, on the other 
a collaborative, inclusive model.  
Political scientists have long questioned the validity of the governance approach (e.g. 
Marinetto 2003; Thompson 2003; Davies 2011).  In reality, governance processes can be 
quite exclusive, closed to outsiders, unrepresentative, unaccountable, difficult to steer and 
can reduce the opportunities for open democratic debate (Bevir and Rhodes 2003, p.75; 
Greenaway et al., 2007; Sorensen and Torfing, 2009; Tait and Barker, 2011).  Consultations 
can diminish accountability, as compromises are negotiated between interested parties 
outside established political processes and institutions (Barry, 2001; Hagendijk and Irwin, 
2006). Networks may only cohere around a problem when people have already taken 
entrenched positions (for example, the GM crops debate in the EU) (Sunstein, 2009).  So a 
governance approach can also limit participation in the policy process and may channel it in 
the direction of greater confrontation. 
While the history of governance during the 20th century may appear as ‘a shifting balance 
between government and governance’ (Rhodes 2007), this should not be interpreted as a 
steady, uniform, linear progression from government to governance (Lyall et al., 2009b). 
Kuhlmann et al. (this issue) contrast ‘tentative modes of governance’ with ‘definitive modes 
of governance’, suggesting that we might find different degrees of governing more or less 
intentionally and incidentally such that ‘a definitive governance initiative might finally turn out 
to develop de facto in a tentative way, and a consciously chosen tentative approach might 
unfold in a way that urges key actors to take tough top-down decisions’. But this notion of 
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hybridity is not especially novel (see, for example, Peter, 2014).  Indeed, one of the main 
protagonists of the ‘hollowing out of the state’ concedes that ‘the traditional instruments of 
government co-mingle, compete and conflict with the new instruments of governance to 
variable effect’ (Rhodes 2007).  Rhodes (ibid.) also admits that ‘the policy networks literature 
pays too little attention to change’ and this is a serious omission in a fast-moving policy field 
such as the life sciences where policy and regulation often struggle to keep pace with the 
science (Tait et al. 2006, 379).    
2.2 Exploring governance – engagement interactions 
If we are to explore the notion of tentative governance in practice, we need to reflect on 
experience and draw lessons for the next generation of governance of EST.   Governance, 
regulation and public engagement have become intimately linked such that, when there are 
cases of regulatory failure, the automatic response is to demand greater engagement. But 
there are serious limitations in the context of the life sciences when ‘bottom up’ governance 
is required to operate within a ‘top down’ regulatory system.  Engagement within such a 
structure pushes groups to extremes and causes turbulence within the system.  This 
demands that we think further about how to ‘do’ governance in a context of increasingly 
complex and sometimes conflicting public perspectives.  
The governance perspective might just be ‘a simplifying lens to a complex reality’ (Stoker 
1998) but policy-makers at all levels believe that improved public participation in the policy-
making process will create more confidence in the resulting policies and ensure more 
effective implementation.  Much has been written about public participation as a new tool of 
governance but public engagement is only one of many influences on the decision-making 
process.  A governance gap exists in the translation between public engagement and policy-
making/regulation: the peril of focusing primarily on engagement is that it ignores the 
underlying complexities of governance.   
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In the UK there have been three defining moments along the trajectory of public engagement 
beginning with the Bodmer report (1985), which characterised the issue as a lack of public 
understanding of science (‘the deficit model’).  The turn towards ‘dialogue’ came in 2000 with 
the publication of the ‘Science and Society’ report (House of Lords, 2000), followed four 
years later with a bold move to bring public engagement ‘upstream’ (Wilsdon and Willis, 
2004).  At each point in this trajectory there was a broad range of different ideas, values and 
interests fighting for dominance. 
This period has witnessed a mainstreaming of public engagement in EU research policy.  In 
the UK this has led to public funding formalised through, for example, Sciencewise and 
Research Councils UK1 and, in turn, the widespread institutionalisation of public 
engagement work and a burgeoning academic literature on public engagement. These 
heterogeneous visions of the governance of science in society, which assume a weak role 
for government, require that ‘more complex visions of governance than simply producing a 
formal input to the government policy process need to be envisaged’ (Felt and Fochler 
2008).  Upstream engagement has been described by its critics as offering ‘compressed 
foresight’, whereby highly uncertain socio-technical prospects are presented as imminent 
and known (Williams, 2006).  The complex interdependencies and optimal level of decision-
making demanded by life science innovation risk becoming subsumed, if we simply equate 
‘governance’ with ‘public engagement’. 
The argument for upstream engagement has been that we failed to engage effectively with 
the public in the development of GM crops and that in future, citizens should have a say in 
the basic funding of science, not just its application. This argument was widely accepted 
among scientists who saw it as a way of convincing the public of the value of what they do 
(Anon, 2004).  If well conducted according to appropriate rules of engagement, it was 
                                                 
1 www.sciencewise-erc.org.uk (last accessed 10/12/18); RCUK has now become UK Research and Innovation 
(UKRI).  An archived copy of the RCUK website is available from the National 
Archives: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/*/http:/www.rcuk.ac.uk/ 
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claimed, such a process could help to improve the quality of the dialogue among a wide 
range of stakeholders on issues related to the development of new technologies. 
In practice, there are problems of applying upstream engagement to the life sciences in 
terms of our foresighting abilities related to innovation outcomes and the biases that are 
inevitable in most stakeholder engagement processes (Tait, 2009b; 2014).  Also, conflict 
related to life-science developments will inevitably arise from a complex mixture of 
uncertainty, power politics, divergent societal interests, values and ideologies, and 
commercial competition. Upstream engagement can create opportunities to reinforce the 
negative framing of new technologies such as nanotechnology or synthetic biology where, 
for many questions, there will be no societal consensus about whether we should develop 
particular technologies.  This may lead to a lack of tolerance of alternative views – a form of 
counter ‘capture’ of public interests.  This perceived de-professionalisation of science 
decision-making leads to decisions based on opinion rather than the best available evidence 
of potential benefits and risks (Collins, 2009).   
The UK Government Office for Science’s resource centre for public dialogue, Sciencewise, 
conducted an international comparison of public dialogue on science and technology 
(Sciencewise, 2010).  Their report acknowledged the challenges of evaluating the impact of 
such public dialogue on the policy-making process and recognised the need for more 
discussion about the uncertainty inherent in the scientific research process.  This report 
recognised the democratic challenges of such a governance approach, including the 
suggestion that ‘we need more public debates which acknowledge the uncertainty inherent 
in novel S&T developments, and move away from traditional positional debate’. The report 
also highlighted the ‘difficulty (and cost) of initiating and sustaining large-scale dialogues on 
science and technology issues which can be said to genuinely represent the views of the 
general public, and which have clear links to policy-making’ (Sciencewise, 2010, p.50). 
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2.3 Consensus: an unattainable goal 
A democratic system is defined by its openness to all but does not require the participation 
of all the people all the time (Stoker 2006, p.154). The complexity of the relationships 
between state and non-state actors may make it difficult for citizens to understand how 
legitimacy and accountability function.  The challenge of a governance approach is that it 
may invite non-accountable actors into the processes of steering (Pierre and Peters 2000, 
p.67).  Deliberation and public engagement may be presented as a democratic route to 
consensus formation, such that ‘once the public understands the ‘real’ issues, then it will 
trust institutions, a ‘reasonable’ consensus will arise, and policy-making can proceed’ 
(Hagendijk and Irwin, 2006).  However, these authors warn that too great an emphasis on 
consensus can lead to a sense of exclusion amongst groups that disagree with the framing 
of the debate.  In policy debates related to the life sciences there is a potential for 
engagement to be dominated by strong, ideologically-based opinions and in plural 
democracies it may not be possible or desirable to reach a consensus.   
Shifting the emphasis from expert groups to advocacy groups (whose views may be based 
predominantly on interests and values or ideology) has the potential to lead to an imbalance 
of power that has no basis in balanced evidentiary standards  (Wagner, 2005; Tait and 
Barker, 2011).  While participatory processes are important ‘to the project of democratizing 
technology’, ‘there can be no automatic presumption that they will necessarily be sufficient, 
or even always positive, in their effects’ (Stirling 2008).  Indeed, dialogue may not insure 
against future public protests: many would argue that the backlash against GM was not a 
consequence of a lack of dialogue between scientists and their publics, or ‘some kind of 
spontaneous outpouring of public anger against ‘Frankenfoods’ but the result of a well-
orchestrated campaign by an alliance of NGOs (Anon 2010; Tait, 2001). 
We do need to be able to recognise the potential for value-based conflict (Bruce, 2011) at an 
earlier stage in the technology trajectory and to create spaces where these aspects can be 
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explored as the trajectory develops: but, in such cases, ‘the relevant science can never be 
settled to the satisfaction of all parties – it is always going to be politicized’ (Sarewitz 2010).  
Where values are a key element in dialogue, we should not ignore them nor force them to be 
expressed in terms of ‘scientific evidence’ but rather we should find a lexicon for talking 
about them openly in the same way that we now do about ‘risk’ (Laurie et al., 2009).   
The conventional view is that participatory methods are more ‘democratically progressive’ 
when linked directly to decision making (Stirling 2008) but Walls et al. (2005) caution against 
romantic interpretations of governance as indicating a ‘uniform popular trend towards the 
democratisation of state decision-making’.  Rather, they suggest that a more plausible 
account is provided by seeing governance as a form of ‘adaptive management necessitated 
by a series of interlocking economic and social changes, and responses to successive risk 
management crises’.  So, a governance approach may have gone too far if we neglect the 
legitimate role of the state and elected decision-makers in decision-making.   
Public dialogue about the sort of society in which we want to live is to be encouraged and 
upstream engagement has brought new voices to decision-making, including activist groups 
working through NGOs. This has been matched by a decline in the influence of industry and 
other professional groups.  Moreover, the voice of ‘ordinary citizens’ (or the ‘innocent citizen’: 
Irwin, 2006) is not necessarily being heard (Tait 2009b).  These new approaches to decision-
making may be no more democratic than before; and the challenge for the future 
governance of the life sciences remains how best to incorporate the most useful aspects of 
governance-based approaches and reconcile them with the still necessary system of 
regulation to ensure product safety and efficacy so that the focus on the ‘public’ does not 
exclude the legitimate behaviour and motivations of others such as industry, scientists, 
policy makers and regulators. 
Irwin (2006) speculates that ‘uncritical treatment of current science–public interactions might 
lead to an equally uncritical backlash when policy expectations of public consensus and 
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support are (almost inevitably) disappointed’.  For Mouffe (2000)2, democracy is better seen 
as inherently antagonistic, rather than as oriented towards consensus building and 
deliberation.  From this perspective, political struggle about the boundaries of government is 
not a drawback of democracy, and public engagement will always be framed in a context of 
contested relations. Instead, we may need to learn to embrace ‘clumsy solutions’ which have 
sought to combine opposing perspectives in other complex policy areas such as climate 
change (Verweij et al. 2006). 
3 Method 
Our work with the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Genomics Network, 
particularly through the Innogen Centre and now Innogen Institute has enabled us to 
observe, and in many cases, gain access to and participate in a number of engagement and 
regulatory initiatives related to the governance of the life sciences and other technologies.  
Examples include the GM Nation? consultation; the Nuffield Council on Bioethics review of 
biofuels; the Food Standards Agency GM dialogue; the Emerging Science and Bioethics 
Advisory Committee (ESBAC); the Synthetic Biology Leadership Council (SBLC); the annual 
report of the Government Office for Science (Walport and Craig, 2014)3; and the British 
Standards Institution-funded projects on Proportionate and Adaptive Governance of 
Innovative Technologies (Tait et al., 2016, 2017) 
Spurred by the premise of ‘starting where you are’ (Lofland and Lofland, 1995), this has 
enabled us to develop a long-term ethnography using document analysis alongside personal 
participation in a series of governance related initiatives to construct two case studies of the 
governance of the life sciences (Section 4).  These cases demonstrate how both tentative 
and adaptive processes of governance have been, or could be, applied by focusing on the 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Hagendijk and Irwin (2006). 
3 http://www.gmnation.org.uk; http://nuffieldbioethics.org; 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120206100416/http://food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2009/nov/gmdia
logue; https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/emerging-science-and-bioethics-advisory-committee; 
https://connect.innovateuk.org/web/synthetic-biology-special-interest-group/synbio-leadership-council (all 
accessed 10/12/18)  
 13 
need to achieve a balance among competing societal influences and power bases, values 
and ideologies, and commercial competition.  Using the material derived from these cases, 
we have tested principles or ‘new rules of engagement’ for tentative and adaptive 
governance of innovative technologies (Section 5), potentially demonstrating how these 
concepts could be implemented in the context of the life sciences.  
As noted above (Section 2.1), different national traditions imbue governance with different 
emphases.  The political economy and historical context play a significant role in shaping the 
political system and this, combined with the nature of our engagement through the ESRC 
Genomics Network, justifies the paper’s specific focus on the UK and, to a slightly lesser 
extent, the European Union. 
4 Case studies of tentative and adaptive governance  
Figure 1 demonstrates how we envisage the relationships between tentative and adaptive 
governance in the bio-economy where innovation is usually constrained by the need for a 
lengthy and expensive regulatory system, involving top-down ‘government’ in order to 
ensure safety and efficacy of novel products and processes. Past experience has shown that 
the transition stage from upstream research to downstream technology development is most 
likely to be the flash-point for the emergence of societal conflict about contentious new 
developments. 
We argue that ‘tentativeness’ is the appropriate mode of action in ‘upstream’ stages of 
scientific research where much is still being learned about whether a product or process will 
work as expected and what kinds of technology will emerge. In some cases at this stage it 
will be appropriate to adopt a precautionary approach, although this should not be
Figure 1. Tentative and Adaptive Governance 
  
 
automatically assumed. Beyond this point, if there are plans to develop a technology further, 
there is increasing pressure on regulators to reach decisions about the appropriate 
regulatory precedent for the new technology. This should be based on the best available 
evidence about its opportunities and risks, and the decision-making process should be 
focused but flexible and adaptive to cope with new information about benefits and risks that 
emerges throughout the development process. The aim should be to ensure that 
unnecessary, unrealistic constraints are not imposed on innovations that meet urgent 
societal priorities.  
These case study examples illustrate our proposition that tentative governance, embodying 
an approach that is provisional, flexible, reversible, dynamic and open, with a focus on 
 15 
uncertainty, is very well suited to the challenges of governance at the upstream stages of 
development when the main focus is on stakeholder engagement and where upstream 
governance should involve experimentation, learning, reflexivity and reversibility. As an 
innovation moves further downstream, the governance approach will increasingly interact 
with top-down government and pre-existing regulatory systems and the governance 
approach will need to become more ‘adaptive’, implying a more controlled approach to 
delivering useful innovation in a societal context, and the need for more downstream 
engagement that brings in stakeholders with a more direct interest in the innovation being 
developed.  
4.1 European Advanced Therapy Medicinal Product Regulation 
The approach taken to the development of the European Advanced Therapy Medicinal 
Product (ATMP) Regulation4 could be seen as an example of tentative governance. At each 
stage, from initial concept in 2002, through various steps in intense consultation with 
interested parties, discussions at European Council meetings amongst the 27 Member 
States, ratification during a single reading in the EU Parliament (2007), implementation of 
the Regulation at the European Medicines Agency (EMA) (2008) and operation of the 
Committee on Advanced Therapies in January 2009.   At each of these stages, the results of 
consultation with the interested parties resulted in modifications to the documents5. 
In addition to the Regulation, which was drafted on the basis of high-level principles, to allow 
flexibility as the science evolved, guidelines were developed by the EMA and the European 
Commission to provide more detail of the requirements for Marketing Authorisation 
Applications (MAAs), and again these were put out for consultation with all interested 
parties.   Thereafter, the documents were finalised. The guidelines were prepared to explain 
in substantial detail the scientific data requirements for MAAs.  Again, at each of the 
                                                 
4http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/advanced-therapies/index_en.htm (accessed 13/12/18); 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/human-use/advanced-therapies/developments/index_en.htm (accessed 13/12/18) 
5 Private communication, 11 December 2012. 
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consultation stages, the results of such exchanges with the interested parties resulted in 
documents being modified. 
Throughout the period from 2002-2008, from concept to the implementation of the 
regulation, consultation with interested parties was intense to allow all to comment.   In view 
of the need to incorporate representatives from the Medical Device Sector at an early stage 
because of the use of devices in tissue-engineered products etc., steps were taken to 
consult with them so that their observations could be taken into account.   The effectiveness 
of this ‘tentative’ approach taken by Dr Paul Weissenberg (Deputy Director General of the 
DG Enterprise and Industry of the European Commission), and the Commission, thus led to 
the notable event that, at the time, this Regulation was the only one that had passed through 
the European Parliament in a single reading. 
As noted above (see Figure 1), tensions are more likely to emerge at the point when 
innovations move from upstream to downstream governance phases. So, despite intensive 
consultation and engagement, serious difficulties emerged in application of the ATMP 
regulations to the downstream development of a range of medical innovations, 
demonstrating the need for regulatory choices to be adaptive in the face of the emerging 
characteristics of the new technology (Marazzi, 2013; Tait et al., 2017).  
For example, the choice of the ATMP Regulation as the appropriate precedent to be applied 
in regulating regenerative medicine and cell therapies, widely consulted on with stakeholders 
at the upstream stages of development of this technology, opened up challenges requiring a 
considerably more adaptive approach to its downstream implementation than was initially 
realised. During its development, the ATMP Regulation was not adapted to deal with living 
human cells, leaving in place the requirement to test products first on animals and creating a 
major challenge to adapt the system to derive meaningful results from such an approach or 
to find an alternative route to these early tests for product safety (Mittra et al., 2015). This 
choice also created the expectation that the therapeutic end products would be delivered by 
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multinational pharmaceutical companies, although they were path-breaking for the 
pharmaceutical sector, leading to on-going reluctance of these companies to invest in this 
new technology (Tait, 2007a) and difficulties in finding viable business models for future 
product development (Omidvar et al., 2014). 
4.2 Nuffield Council on Bioethics (NCOB) Reports 
The NCOB was funded by the UK Medical Research Council, Nuffield Foundation and 
Wellcome Trust to identify and define ethical questions raised by advances in biological and 
medical research in order to respond to, and to anticipate, public concerns, to promote public 
understanding and discussion, leading where necessary to the formulation of guidelines by 
the appropriate regulatory or other bodies. Two reports from the NCOB illustrate contrasting 
approaches to achieving a balance among the interests and values of stakeholders: (i) 
‘Emerging Biotechnologies: technology, choice and the public good’ (NCOB, 2012) takes a 
clearly tentative approach to governance and focuses on the ethical issues relevant to 
upstream research and (ii) ‘Biofuels: Ethical Issues’ (NCOB, 2011) takes a more adaptive 
approach to governance and focuses on issues raised in the downstream development of 
biofuels. The Working Parties charged with producing these two reports carried out public 
consultations over a period of several months to obtain views from as wide a range of 
interested parties as possible and received 80-90 responses. Each also held a series of 
evidence-gathering workshops with scientists, social scientists and policy makers. The 
Biofuels Working Party held two additional workshops with industry and with civil society 
groups. Although the two working groups adopted similar procedures, and the reports reflect 
the need to balance the views of the wide range of constituencies consulted, their 
conclusions reflect the different stages of development of technologies being addressed.  
The recommendations arising from the 2012 Emerging Biotechnologies Report focused 
much more strongly on research policy and science funding and less on the potential ethical 
challenges, costs, risks and benefits of products and processes arising from novel 
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technologies. The general approach adopted was congruent with a tentative governance 
approach. It proposes that governance should be guided by a ‘public ethics’ approach to 
addressing the question of how society should determine the conditions through which to 
foster socially and ethically responsible innovation in biotechnology.  The public ethics 
approach, as with the Biofuels Report, refers to the underlying values of equity, solidarity 
and sustainability, but with a much stronger focus on future visions for emerging 
biotechnologies and avoiding an ‘optimism bias’ for prospective technologies. Emerging 
biotechnologies are seen to pose three challenges – uncertainty, ambiguity (i.e. they can be 
valued in different ways in different contexts), and transformative potential (i.e. they can 
change common ways of life and open up new ranges of possibilities).  In thinking about 
these three challenges, the framing of governance questions is seen to have a significant 
impact on how biotechnologies are developed.  This observation will have implications for 
the strong emphasis of this report on public engagement in contributing to a more ethically 
robust public decision-making process. 
The 2011 Biofuels Report included both currently available biofuels and those that may 
emerge in future based on new scientific discoveries, taking account of concerns about 
energy security, economic development and climate change and a need for an adaptive 
governance approach in the contexts of public policy and targets for the introduction of 
biofuels. Five ethical principles were proposed that should be met in the development of 
biofuels related to: the protection of basic human rights; contributing overall to environmental 
sustainability; contributing to a net reduction in greenhouse gas emissions; recognising the 
rights of people to just reward; and distributing the costs and benefits of biofuels in an 
equitable way. An unusual balancing feature in this report was the addition of a sixth 
principle: if the first five principles are respected and if biofuels can play a crucial role in 
mitigating dangerous climate change then, depending on certain key considerations, there is 
a duty to develop such biofuels (Buyx and Tait, 2011). The key considerations envisaged 
included the requirement that the process was economically viable in competition with other 
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approaches to climate change mitigation. Such balancing caveats are often implied in ethical 
discourses but they are rarely stated so positively. 
These two NCOB reports exemplify the difference between tentative and adaptive 
approaches to governance in dealing with innovation in the life sciences. The Emerging 
Biotechnologies Report focused more on upstream issues, uncertainty, precaution and 
broad ranging stakeholder engagement as a basis for policy decision making. The Biofuels 
Report on the other hand focused on more downstream issues, emphasising quantitative 
analytical evidence as a basis for decisions on sustainability of biofuel developments and 
considering how evidence could be acquired as a basis for decision making on the ethical 
aspects of biofuel development, rather than undertaking formal public engagement as the 
primary basis for such decisions. 
5 ‘Second generation’ governance – adaptation and new rules of engagement  
5.1 A more interdisciplinary approach  
In the context of EST, governance is about managing complexity and ‘finding the optimal 
level of decision-making and dispersion, power and legitimacy, participation and action’ (de 
la Mothe, 2001).  In the UK, the notion of governance finds its antecedents in work on 
advocacy coalitions, New Public Management and participatory democracy.  This literature 
was grounded in studies of privatisation in the 1990s; the loss of central and local 
government departments to private sector delivery systems; and a shift from British 
government to EU institutions.  While the focus was on relationships that spanned the 
boundaries between the public and private sector, and between administrative units within 
government, it clearly did not address the specific challenges of applying it in the context of 
new and emerging technologies.   
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Many sociologists of science and other scholars aligned with the discipline of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS)6 have adopted the lexicon of ‘governance’ as an approach to 
navigating and understanding the complex and dynamic arena of science-society relations.  
STS has espoused the terminology of governance in the context of new technology and, in 
particular, innovation in the life sciences without, in many cases, engaging with the critical 
self-reflection undertaken by political scientists of the limitations of network governance 
theory.   
Within STS, public engagement has largely become a synonym for governance and has 
attained a potent orthodoxy.  The social sciences’ engagement with the life sciences has 
typically been modulated through ‘ELSI’ (ethical, legal and social implications)7, which casts 
social scientists variously as advocates, translators, critics, activists, reformers (Calvert and 
Martin, 2009) or intermediaries in the mobilisation of public sentiment (Williams, 2006).  This 
tends to position them as mediators rather than scholars in their own right (Rip, 2009) and 
may limit their role to one of public/stakeholder engagement. While reflexivity is important, 
past efforts may have shifted the balance too far in this direction (Rip, 2009) and, as 
Williams (2006) notes, ‘this somewhat privileged position places a special responsibility on 
STS researchers to consider their commitments with great care.’  The expertise required for 
conducting participatory exercises needs to be ‘both conscious and critical of the visions of 
science, society, governance and participation’ (Felt and Fochler, 2008).  Furthermore, it 
needs to take the performativity of these methods seriously ‘rather than being committed to a 
naïve ideal of neutrality’ and efforts to develop more substantive modes and formats of 
engagement ‘need[s] to be accompanied by a critical debate on the expertise of the 
community’ (Felt and Fochler, 2008; also Rose, 1999).  This theme is taken up by Webster 
(2007) in calls for a more ‘serviceable STS’ that can engage effectively with policy making 
while retaining a critical and independent perspective.  While a more traditional, government 
                                                 
6 See Fagerberg et al. (2012) and other articles in that issue of Research Policy for a discussion of the 
emergence of STS as a discipline. 
7 And now ELSI 2.0 (Kaye et al. 2012). 
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approach expects advisers to take a neutral role equivalent to that of Pielke’s ‘honest broker’ 
(Pielke, 2007), the governance approach has encouraged issue advocacy and, at times, 
stealth advocacy (Tait, 2017): the time may indeed have come for the STS community to find 
a relationship to public engagement that moves beyond criticism alone (Irwin et al., 2013). 
The shift to governance further means that the science policy literature now bridges the 
more positivistic traditions of political science and the interpretive, socially constructed 
approach taken by those in STS.  A core element of this approach has been the 
development of ‘public engagement’ both as an object of study and, in many cases, a form 
of action research.  Irwin (2006) suggests that we must move away from the orthodox 
science and technology studies defence of public participation and citizen-science 
engagement towards ‘an analytically sceptical (but not dismissive) perspective on the new 
mode of scientific governance’.  Engaging in a wider dialogue across a wider range of social 
science disciplines and professional functions would bring in expertise in innovation 
systems, regulation, governance and economics.  
Some authors call for a ‘second generation’ approach to governance (e.g. Rehmann-Sutter, 
2012) and this again throws different disciplinary approaches into relief. Within the political 
sciences literature, ‘second generation’ governance theory has been concerned with the 
legitimacy of evolving governance structures, including partnerships and networks, and 
contrasts representative democracy with the interactive model, which is essentially 
deliberative in nature (Barnett 2011).  As Barnett notes, a key critique of the deliberative 
approach has been that it is extremely difficult to operationalise and ‘uncontaminated’ 
deliberation is virtually impossible to achieve.  Bevir and Rhodes (2010) describe this second 
wave of governance as ‘metagovernance’ where the state co-ordinates self-regulating 
governance mechanisms and acts, in the case of governance failure, as ‘accountable body 
of last resort’ (Davies 2011, p.19). 
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5.2 Constructive stakeholder engagement 
Stakeholder engagement is one of the main platforms of a tentative governance approach 
and this paper proposes that tentativeness in governance, with its focus on engagement and 
uncertainty, is a desirable characteristic during the earlier stages of scientific research when 
it is still unclear what will work in scientific and technological terms, what kinds of novel 
products and processes will eventually reach a market place, and how they will be perceived 
by various stakeholder communities.  
Questioning the hegemony of public engagement may not be fashionable.  Nevertheless, in 
their essay looking back on the two decades since the journal Public Understanding of 
Science was launched, Stilgoe et al. (2014) acknowledge that public engagement would 
seem to be ‘a necessary but insufficient part of opening up science and its governance’.  In 
their role as public engagement practitioners, they concede to ‘over-promising’ and 
recognise ‘a collective failure to take politics seriously’ (ibid.). 
We are not advocating a return to the economically-dominated model of science policy of the 
1980s and 1990s but sustaining tentative governance networks and undertaking public 
engagement exercises are resource intensive endeavours.  If we are to undertake 
meaningful engagement in debates about EST, then we must surely aspire to do it in the 
most effective manner.  For Stilgoe et al. (2014), the focus is shifting from ‘why’ we promote 
public engagement with science towards ‘when’, while for others the important question is 
‘how’ actors work together to provide governance (Peters, 2014).  
In developing our case studies, we have identified the need for a more constructive 
approach to stakeholder engagement than has generally been undertaken to date. The 
guidelines proposed in Table 1, operationalise the ideals of tentative governance in being 
provisional, flexible, revisable, dynamic and open.  These guidelines have been distilled from 
our experiences in the above examples and a range of other case studies (Tait and 
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Chataway, 2010; Tait et al., 2007a,b; Tait, 2007b) with the aim to make stakeholder dialogue 
more constructive in potentially contentious areas of life science innovation, dealing with 
issues of public choice and stakeholder engagement in contributing to regulatory decision-
making within a democratic system.  
Unless managed well, tentative governance in upstream engagement processes (where the 
science and technology are still subject to considerable uncertainty), has the potential to 
generate conflict and polarisation (Sunstein, 2009) and to jeopardise the development of 
societally useful technologies further downstream (Tait, 2009b). Where stakeholders, of 
whatever complexion, are involved in formal engagement it is helpful to have such guidelines 
to set standards for the equitable and balanced conduct of the process (Tait et al.,. 2018). 
Table 1:  Guidelines for Constructive Stakeholder Engagement  
1. Discussions should be open and accommodating of the full range of relevant 
opinions (general public/citizens, scientists, industry, users of the technology, 
consumers) and no single perspective should expect to dominate other opinions 
or to dictate the terms of engagement 
2. Engagement should be carefully timed: too early (upstream) and its value will be 
undermined by uncertainty about the nature of future developments; too late and 
stakeholder opinions and political positions may have become entrenched so that 
accommodation will be more difficult to achieve 
3. Where views are strongly polarised, engagement will not necessarily lead to 
consensus and expectations that all stakeholder views can be accommodated will 
not be met.  Accept that consensus may not be attainable 
4. Promote dialogue across a wider range of issues to include the processes by 
which new scientific discoveries are translated to products in a market place and 
how this process is regulated 
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5. Consider under what circumstances it is appropriate to leave it to market forces to 
decide what products should be available, rather than allowing the values and 
interests of one group to restrict the freedom of choice of others 
6. Set standards for the quality and breadth of evidence that is brought to 
discussions about novel technologies and their regulation 
7. Consider carefully whose precaution should be relevant to a decision, and what 
we should be precautionary about  
8. Where there are conflicting values, be equitably sceptical about the impartiality of 
evidence presented in support of a case, particularly evidence contributed by 
organised groups representing commercial interests or NGOs 
9. Where there is conflicting evidence, consider carefully the expertise of those 
promoting the evidence, including both scientific and experiential expertise, and 
weight it accordingly. Do not allow one interest group to have a degree of 
influence on regulatory standards that is not justified by evidence, to the 
detriment of other interests 
10. Have a clear plan for moving to an evidence-based approach as experience with 
a new technology accumulates 
 
5.3 Adaptive Governance of Innovative Technologies 
Governance is still a ‘relatively young instrument’ in innovation studies, which assumes that 
solutions can be found for all conflicts and that diversity enhances the quality of decision-
making (Nowotny and Testa, 2010).  However, the lack of common values restricts decisions 
‘to the smallest common denominator’ and the process is decoupled from the institutions of 
representative democracy (ibid. pp78-79).  This emphasises the point that dialogue and 
deliberation are not equivalent (see, for example, Escobar, 2011).  Participation does not 
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necessarily result in meaningful dialogue, nor is participation synonymous with decision-
making. The two practices take place in different spaces and with different configurations of 
actors and, as noted above, while tentativeness in governance is a desirable characteristic 
during the earlier stages of scientific research, as new products and processes are 
developed and refined with specific markets in mind, the governance process will be under 
pressure to become more focused and choices will be made about the appropriate 
regulatory precedents for the new technology. Beyond this point, tentativeness is no longer a 
desirable attribute and the primary requirement of the governance approach is that it should 
be adaptive to changes in our understanding of the technology and its properties. The 
stakeholder engagement guidelines set out in Table 1 will still be relevant in this adaptive 
context, but there will be considerably less uncertainty about the risks and benefits of the 
technology involved and the topics taken up in the dialogue will (or should) be more about 
how the technology should be implemented, how it should be regulated and who should 
reap the benefits. 
Much of the focus on public engagement has led to governance in the absence of 
government and this has limited its effectiveness.   In the life sciences, when dealing with 
uncertainty in the face of rapidly changing technologies, we have shown that governance 
cannot take place without government (Lyall et al. 2009b).  The governance shorthand 
misleadingly assumes that governance is a homogeneous entity or activity but this is clearly 
not the case in the field of EST.  Moreover, this shorthand fails to address the governance 
gaps that persist between participation, deliberation and decision-making.   
There can be a tendency for societal discussions about the desirability of life-science 
innovations to ignore the fact that the technology will be regulated and must be proven safe 
before it reaches the market (Tait 2009b; Tait, 2014).  One value of a democratic 
governance process lies in its ability to prevent vested interests from dominating policy 
decision-making and to enable open choices for as many citizens as possible but policy 
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needs to be proportionate to the risks and benefits to individuals and to society, allowing for 
different applications depending on the context (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011, p.78; 
Academy of Medical Sciences, 2011; Tait et al., 2017).   
None of the foregoing discussion implies that there should not be room for serious and 
intractable disagreements over the introduction of EST. Such debate is an important part of 
political processes but we argue that acknowledging some of the limitations of governance 
structures may enable a more constructive set of alternatives to emerge.  We have to find 
appropriate times and appropriate ways of undertaking participation and then construct more 
transparent ways of conducting the deliberation.   
On the one hand we are witnessing much experimentation with practices, institutional 
arrangements, regulations, and instruments but, on the other hand, there is also a move 
back to more stable modes of governance.  As Kuhlmann et al. (this issue) note, certain 
forms of tentative governance ‘operate in the shadow of hierarchy’ not least because 
industries have often welcomed regulatory collaboration because of the stability, certainty 
and property protection that regulation can provide. When tentative modes of governance 
are introduced into public policy, Kuhlmann et al. therefore suggest that they are closely 
related to more stable and formal governance modes such as legislation. Clearly, the 
overlapping government/governance trajectory (Figure 1) acquires new degrees of 
complexity in the context of the life sciences where the regulatory time-scale is greater than 
ten years, costs more than $500 million, where market choices are usually not made by 
individual citizens, and where the nature of the science, itself, along with the products to 
which it gives rise are often publicly contentious (Tait, 2009a).   
Within the context of EST, the governance-based approach was promoted in a spirit of 
optimism as a means to achieve more democratic and more robust political processes and 
decisions, distributing power more equitably across societal groups. However, in many 
cases, the outcome has been greater complexity, which has acted to create a different sort 
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of democratic deficit – a shift in the locus of the power base without corresponding 
improvement in the responsibility with which that power is exercised.  The governance 
experiment of the past 20 years - involving a more bottom-up, stakeholder-led approach to 
risk management (Lyall and Tait, 2005), as applied to innovation in the life sciences - has not 
delivered greater consensus in decision-making: this is, as we argue above, a generally 
unrealistic and unattainable goal.   
Stakeholder engagement practices that could lead to more democratic outcomes in the 
context of polarized and ideologically motivated opinions (Sunstein, 2009) are still unusual. 
We need clearer strategic thinking on how to implement a governance approach under these 
circumstances that encourages equitable dialogue across all societal groups, including 
scientists, industry, regulators, NGOs and citizens.   
Research on governance-related issues in life sciences has identified an ‘appropriate’ 
approach as one that is enabling of innovation, minimises risk to people and the 
environment, and balances the interests and values of relevant stakeholders (Tait 2012).  
Achieving this balance requires a willingness to engage with the notion of tentative 
governance, and to be adaptive and willing to rethink and refine the basis on which we 
engage the full spectrum of stakeholders in these policy debates as our knowledge expands. 
6 Conclusions 
Governance is a highly problematic term when applied to innovation; often used 
indiscriminately and with various prefatory adjectives that tend to move us away from the 
original, more focused view of participative, network-based policy-making.  As others have 
noted, the ‘openness of the concept of governance…is both a strength and a weakness for 
the development of this body of theory’ and there remains a ‘good deal of skepticism about 
the general applicability of the concept’ (Peters, 2014).  To a certain degree, we share this 
scepticism when discussing the concept of ‘tentative governance’.  
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As governance reaches a new level of maturity we could usefully revisit some of the debates 
about the role of deliberative democracy (e.g. Rayner, 2003; 2007) in order to be more 
constructive in our democratic engagement.  This implies a dynamic continuum of 
relationships between science and society which must allow the policy and the politics back 
in to participation. A more interdisciplinary approach is required which learns from the 
political scientists’ experience of governance theory where scholars increasingly believe that 
the ‘high tide’ of network governance may have passed (Davies, 2011, p.4). 
If governance is ‘tentative’ when it is designed or evolves in response to a particularly 
dynamic process to manage interdependencies and contingencies, then, ultimately, there 
are improvements to be made in engagement processes and in the appropriate involvement 
of the social sciences.  Within STS we have witnessed and, in many cases, facilitated the 
trajectory from deficit model to public engagement to upstream engagement.  What we have 
learned is that a governance approach enlarges the political vision and the constellations of 
actors involved in policy making but it is not a panacea for the complexities of the modern 
policy world: intensely political decisions remain and must be taken by elected decision-
makers.  We also know that participation and decision-making take place at different levels 
and this leads to a significant governance gap. If there is to be a second generation of 
governance for the life sciences, it needs to make a mature assessment of the limitations of 
participation where consensus may not be possible or even desirable.   
Kuhlmann et al. (this issue) suggest that ‘tentative governance’ serves as a heuristic to 
investigate whether a mode of governance is capable of reflexivity and they propose that 
EST governance increasingly searches and applies new approaches to cope with the 
problems of uncertainty. If governance in practice is to explicitly take into account the 
‘tentativeness’ of the endeavour then we must strive to bring the three key elements – 
scientific evidence, public opinion and politics – into a better balance by adopting some new 
rules of engagement if we are to achieve a nuanced and serviceable understanding of 
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tentative governance within the context of policy making for the life sciences. Beyond this, as 
we argue above, while tentativeness is a useful attribute at the more upstream stages of 
development of an innovation, governance needs to become more adaptive and less 
tentative as it moves to more downstream stages of development.  
If it is to resolve some of the still-extant dilemmas in the life sciences, a tentative governance 
approach needs to be equitably sceptical in appraising the evidence brought to the table by 
all interested parties (including companies and NGOs); it needs to be equitable in its 
involvement of all stakeholders in engagement initiatives; and it needs to be equitable in the 
way in which it acknowledges risks and opportunities (Tait et al., 2018).  Ultimately, however, 
there may be no substitute for good judgement on the part of policy decision makers and 
supporting that process is a key potential contribution from social science research.  
If we are to move beyond the limits to governance and develop a more critical understanding 
of its application in specific policy areas then we must better address the notion of ‘balance’ 
which is an aspect of governance that has been under-emphasised to date.  As Kuhlmann et 
al. (this issue) note, many of the papers in this special section show that ‘tentative 
governance involves a balancing between creating flexibility and stability, opening and 
closing options, and more or less tentative forms’.  We share this view and we also 
recognise the hybrid nature of many governance approaches and share common ground 
with the Editors’ concept of ‘tentative governance’ as it seeks to ‘capture actors’ attempts at 
creating spaces for probing and learning’.  
Clearly, in an area as complex as the life sciences, governance and government approaches 
must be intertwined, with the hard core of government increasingly wrapped with a soft, 
outer layer of governance.  Some of our suggestions for new rules of engagement may take 
us a step back towards previous government approaches that required separation of factual 
evidence as a basis for policy decisions from the political process of dealing with conflicting 
interests and values. In order to move beyond the limits to governance, we may be able to 
 30 
use the heuristic device offered by tentative governance as a step towards developing and 
adopting new rules of engagement.  However, we favour the adaptive governance approach 
over this proposed tentative concept, valuing the former’s focus on progression and 
improvement.  If it is to achieve sufficient traction, the ‘tentative governance’ approach needs 
to move beyond its neutral stance ‘with regards to adaptation or improvement, learning or 
sheer experimentation’ (Kuhlmann et al. this issue) in order to cope more effectively with the 
problems of uncertainty in areas such as the life sciences. 
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